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“Under my administration, anyone who illegally crosses the
border will be detained until they are removed out of our
country and back to the country from which they came.”1
† J.D. Georgetown University Law Center; M.Phil. University of Cambridge;
B.A. University of Oklahoma. Ms. Woods currently serves as a staff attorney for Texas
RioGrande Legal Aid, where she provides legal services to detained asylum seekers at
the South Texas Family Residential Center in Dilley, Texas. This article was written in
Ms. Woods’s personal capacity and does not reflect the opinions of her employer.
1. Philip Bump, Here’s What Donald Trump Said in His Big Immigration Speech,
Annotated, WASH. POST (Aug. 31, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/th
e-fix/w
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“We cannot allow all of these people to invade our Country.
When somebody comes in, we must immediately, with no
Judges or Court Cases, bring them back from where they
came. Our system is a mockery to good immigration policy
and Law and Order.”2
I. INTRODUCTION
As a cornerstone of the rule of law, due process is guaranteed by
the U.S. Constitution to all individuals in the United States, regardless
if they are present in the country temporarily or illegally. The Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause grants full protections to
immigrants in removal proceedings. However, President Trump—
and to a large extent his administration—is resolute in his desire to
deny these protections to immigrants present in the United States. In
January 2017, President Trump issued an executive order on Border
Security and Immigration Enforcement, announcing his intention to
end the practice of “catch and release”—releasing immigrants into the
community while their immigration court hearings are pending.3 The
Trump administration quickly took steps to implement the mass
detention of illegal immigrants, many of whom were asylum seekers.
These steps included identifying locations and existing infrastructure
for new immigrant detention facilities along the U.S.-Mexico border.
Although the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) allows for
the indefinite detention of asylum seekers in removal proceedings,4
cases have repeatedly challenged the constitutionality of this practice.
p/2016/08/31/heres-what-donald-trump-said-in-his-big-immigration-speech-
annotated/?utm_term=.b8e91a1855ca [https://perma.cc/4SYQ-LXXM] (quoting
Donald Trump, during his U.S. presidential campaign).
2. Ellen Cranley, Trump Tweets He Wants to Deport Illegal Immigrants ‘With
No Judges or Court Cases’—a Move That Would Violate Due Process, BUS.
INSIDER (June 24, 2018), https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-tweets-deport-
illegal-immigrants-no-judges-court-cases-2018-6 [https://perma.cc/MX77-F92V]
(quoting President Donald Trump (Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER





3. Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793 (Jan. 25, 2017).
4. Immigration and Nationality Act § 235(b)(1)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii)
(2016) (stating that aliens shall be detained for “further consideration of the
application for asylum”).
2
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Most recently, in February 2018, the Supreme Court was asked to rule
on the constitutionality of indefinite detention for certain detained
aliens in Jennings v. Rodriguez.5 The Court declined to rule directly on
this issue, and instead held that detained immigrants awaiting
immigration proceedings had no due process right to periodic bond
hearings. As the lower courts continue to grapple with the legality of
prolonged immigration detention, the U.S. government detains more
than 40,000 individuals on any given day, according to Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE).6
Deprivation of liberty is not the only due process concern relating
to prolonged or indefinite detention of immigrants who are awaiting
their court hearings. Currently, no general due process right exists for
the appointment of counsel for immigrants in removal hearings.7 The
geographic location, physical infrastructures, and resources available
to detained immigrants make it difficult for them to obtain legal
counsel or represent themselves pro se. These challenges are even
more difficult for indigent immigrants in detention. Many
immigration detention facilities are located in rural regions, far from
major metropolitan areas, making it difficult for detained immigrants
to obtain affordable counsel, if counsel is available at all.8 The capacity
for legal services at immigrant detention facilities, including rooms
for legal representatives to meet with detained clients, phone
accessibility, and receipt of mail, is extremely limited.9 Additionally,
resources for pro se applicants, such as legal and administrative
resources, and even pen and paper, are scarce. In the case of asylum
seekers in immigration detention, the consequences of lacking
5. 138 S. Ct. 830, 851 (2018).
6. Garrett Epps, How the Supreme Court is Expanding the Immigrant Detention
System, ATLANTIC (Mar. 9, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/201
8/03/jennings-v-rodriguez/555224 [https://perma.cc/H6WC-84JV].
7. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1240.48, 1240.3 (2014) (stating respondents have the right
to “examine and object to the evidence against him or her, to present evidence in his
or her own behalf and to cross-examine witnesses presented by the government,” and
the right to “be represented at the hearing by an attorney or other representative”;
however, not at the government’s expense); Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v.
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038–39 (1984) (“The purpose of deportation is not
to punish past transgression, but rather to put an end to a continuing violation of the
immigration laws . . . [thus], various protections that apply in the context of a criminal
trial do not apply in a deportation hearing.”).
8. Kyle Kim, Immigrants Held in Remote ICE Facilities Struggle to Find Legal Aid
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counsel could lead to the arbitrary deprivation of life if the detainee is
returned to a country where near-certain death awaits.
There exists a broad range of legal scholarship analyzing the need
and legal basis for appointed counsel to indigent asylum seekers that
this article does not intend to duplicate. Instead, this article seeks to
bolster the argument that appointed counsel to indigent asylum
seekers awaiting removal proceedings is a necessary procedural due-
process safeguard because of the real-world challenges indigent
asylum seekers face in obtaining counsel or representing themselves
pro se while in detention. Part II briefly lays out existing legal
frameworks impacting the discretionary detainment of asylum
seekers in the United States, specifically focusing on the effects on
indigent asylum seekers. Part III first summarizes the leading legal
arguments for the need of appointed counsel to represent indigent
asylum seekers, before bolstering these legal arguments by
presenting an overview of the real-world barriers detained asylum
seekers face in obtaining effective legal counsel or in representing
themselves within today’s immigration detention system. Part IV
concludes by positing that if the current administration continues
down a path towards large-scale immigrant detention, the
government must consider appointment of counsel to indigent
detained asylum seekers to protect their procedural due process
rights.
II. DETENTION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS AWAITING REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS
Not all asylum seekers are subject to detention—only those
raising asylum as a defense to their removal from the United States
may be detained. Affirmative asylum applicants are not in active
removal proceedings, which means that the U.S. government is not
actively trying to deport these immigrants. Affirmative asylum
applicants submit an asylum application that is adjudicated by the U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS) in a non-courtroom
setting. Defensive asylum applicants, however, raise asylum as an
affirmative defense against deportation in removal proceedings.
Defensive asylum seekers usually fall in to one of two categories:
(1) those who have entered the United States without permission and
are considered “applicants for admission,” and (2) those who have
been arrested in the interior and are awaiting a decision on their
removability for either unlawful presence or for committing specific
4
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criminal offenses.10 The law allows for the detention of these
individuals awaiting review of their asylum claim in either of these
postures.11 Under 8 U.S.C. §1225(b), if an asylum officer finds that an
applicant for admission has a credible fear of persecution in their
home country, that individual “shall be detained for further
consideration of the application for asylum.”12 Similarly, 8 U.S.C. §
1226 gives the U.S. Attorney General the power to take into custody
and detain any non-citizen pending a decision on their removability.
Importantly, this provision establishes terms by which a detained
non-citizen may be released pending a decision on their removability.
A. The Constitutionality of Prolonged Immigration Detention
Although the law allows the detention of asylum seekers in
removal proceedings, it does not require detention. Previous
presidential administrations have developed a practice of releasing
detained asylum seekers into the community on bond or with
electronic ankle monitoring pending adjudication of their asylum
claims—a policy pejoratively referred to as “catch and release.”13
Immigration courts in the United States are facing a huge backlog of
cases; statistics as of March 2018 showed upwards of 690,000 open
deportation cases pending in immigration court; on average, these
cases have been pending for more than 700 days.14 Individuals who
ultimately were granted deportation relief in immigration cases by
March 2018 had, on average, waited more than 1000 days for this
outcome.15 Although these statistics refer to more than asylum
adjudications, these numbers highlight the serious risk that is
10. See Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, § 235, 66 Stat. 163 (1952)
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (2008); § 236, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified
as amended 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (1996)).
11. Immigration and Nationality Act § 236(c)(1); 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b),
1226(c)(1).
12. Immigration and Nationality Act § 235(b)(1)(ii); 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii).
13. Stacy Sullivan, We Shouldn’t Take the Bait on ‘Catch and Release’, AM. C.L.
UNION (July 20, 2018), https://www.aclu.org/blog/immigrants-rights/immigrants-
rights-and-detention/we-shouldnt-take-bait-catch-and-release
[https://perma.cc/6VGD-VREU].
14. Asylum in the United States, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (May 14, 2018),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/asylum-united-states
[https://perma.cc/B2Y6-GPT5].
15. Id.; see also Average Time Pending Cases Have Been Waiting in Immigration
Courts as of June 2018, TRAC REPORTS, http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/co
urt_backlog/apprep_backlog_avgdays.php [https://perma.cc/NWW9-D4PK].
5
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inherent in detaining individuals pending the outcome of their
defensive asylum applications—the risk of detaining individuals for
years awaiting the conclusion of their immigration proceedings.
The U.S. Supreme Court has begun to address challenges to the
prolonged or indefinite detention of immigrants in a piecemeal
fashion. In Zadvydas v. Davis, the Court found that prolonged or
indefinite detention of individuals awaiting removal under 8 U.S.C. §
1231(a)(6) would raise “serious constitutional questions,” and
construed the statute to contain an implicit “reasonable time”
limitation.16 In Demore v. Kim, the Court held
that mandatory detention was constitutional under 8 U.S.C. §
1226(c) only in situations where the detained individual did not
contest deportability and where detention was brief with “a definite
termination point.”17 In Jennings v. Rodriguez, the Court was asked to
rule on the constitutionality of prolonged immigration detention
awaiting the completion of removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. §§
1225(b), 1226(a), and 1226(c).18 However, the Court expressly
declined to address this question and instead focused on the narrow
issue of whether to construe the statutory provisions to include a
“reasonable time” limitation, given due process concerns.19
In the underlying case, the Ninth Circuit found an implicit
limitation on the amount of time a noncitizen could be detained while
awaiting adjudication of their removability. Drawing from Zadvydas,
the Ninth Circuit reasoned that detention became “prolonged” at the
six-month mark. After this time period, individuals detained under 8
U.S.C. §§ 1225(b), 1226(a), and 1226(c) are entitled to a bond hearing
to avoid constitutional due process concerns—regardless of whether
this detention was mandatory or discretionary.20 In Jennings, the
Supreme Court rejected this reasoning and found that 8 U.S.C. §§
1225(b) and 1226(a) clearly authorized mandatory detention of
individuals in removal proceedings for well-delineated periods of
time—”for further consideration” and “pending a decision” on
16. 533 U.S. 678, 679–80 (2001).
17. 538 U.S. 510, 512 (2003); accord AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, PROLONGED
IMMIGRATION DETENTION OF INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE CHALLENGING REMOVAL 1 (2009),
https://www.aclu.org/other/issue-brief-prolonged-immigration-detention-
individuals-who-are-challenging-removal [https://perma.cc/V7PV-8S24].
18. 138 S. Ct. 830, 845 (2018).
19. Id. at 843.
20. Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060, 1069 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Zadvydas,
533 U.S. at 682).
6
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removal, respectively—while 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) clearly delineates
very specific reasons why an individual may be released, thus
restricting generalized release on bond and repudiating any need for
a “reasonable time” limitation.21
Although the law allows for mandatory detention of certain
asylum seekers during the length of their removal proceedings, the
constitutionality of this practice remains suspect given the
inordinately long time frames of such proceedings.22 Despite the
questionable constitutionality of mandatory detentions, the Trump
administration continues to ramp up large-scale immigration
detention.23 The Trump administration views release of immigrants
pending removal adjudications as a policy failure leading to the
release of deportable non-citizens that may abscond from eventual,
lawful removal.24 In January 2017, President Trump issued Executive
Order 13767 on Border Security and Immigration Enforcement,
which announced the termination of the so-called practice of “catch
and release.”25 The order directed the Secretary of Homeland Security
to “ensure the detention of aliens apprehended for violations of
immigration law pending the outcome of their removal proceedings
or their removal from the country to the extent permitted by law.”26
The Trump administration also ordered the Secretary of Homeland
Security to “take all appropriate action and allocate all legally
available resources to immediately construct, operate, control, or
establish contracts to construct, operate, or control facilities to detain
aliens at or near the land border with Mexico” and to “end the abuse
of parole and asylum provisions currently used to prevent the lawful
21. Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 875.
22. Press Release, American Immigration Lawyers Assn., SCOTUS Jennings
Decision Won’t Be the Last Word on Bond Hearings for Immigrants (Feb. 27, 2018),
https://www.aila.org/advo-media/press-releases/2018/scotus-jennings-decision-
wont-be-the-last-word [https://perma.cc/46AY-U2SR]; see also Reid v. Donelan, 819
F.3d 486, 502 (1st Cir. 2016), vacated, Nos. 14-1270, 14-1803, 14-1823, 2018 WL
4000993 (1st Cir. 2018); Sopo v. Attorney Gen., 825 F.3d 1199, 1220 (11th Cir. 2016),
vacated, 890 F.3d 952, 953–54 (11th Cir. 2018); Chavez-Alvarez v. Warden York Cty.
Prison, 783 F.3d 469, 472, 478 (2015).
23. Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793 (Jan. 25, 2017); Jeff Sessions,




24. See Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8793; Sessions, supra note 23.
25. Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8793.
26. Id.
7
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removal of removable aliens.”27 Unless the courts declare the practice
of prolonged immigrant detention pending removal proceedings
unconstitutional, an increase in this practice seems imminent.28
B. Wealth as Determinative to Release on Bond Pending Removal
Proceedings
Among detained asylum seekers who are awaiting removal
proceedings, data suggests a strong correlation between wealth and
the probability of release on bond. This correlation is in part tied to
the private, for-profit prison industry, which operates 71% of ICE’s
immigration detention centers.29 Beginning in 2008, for-profit
companies began focusing on federal immigration detention
contracts.30 Around this same time, immigration detention numbers
spiked.31 In 2010, private-prison lobbyists persuaded Congress to
mandate daily immigration detention quotas, requiring ICE to
maintain approximately 33,500 immigration detention beds
“nationwide, every day, regardless of need.”32 Similarly, within
individual contracts, many for-profit prison operators have secured
fixed payments and minimum occupancy rates.33 These quotas
further encourage immigrant detention regardless of need or
countervailing public policy considerations.34
27. Id.
28. One exception to this statement involves family detention. President Trump
has reversed course in relation to prolonged detention of family units awaiting
removal proceedings, mainly because such detention conflicts with the Flores
settlement. Janon Fisher, Trump Administration Flip-flops on ‘Catch and Release’ of
Immigrants, Will Allow Electronic Monitoring, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Jul. 10, 2018),
http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/ny-catch-and-release-trump-
immigration-policy-20180710-story.html [https://perma.cc/3NH2-JD6A]; Abby
Vesoulis, President Trump Now Wants to Detain Parents and Children Together. That’s
Likely to Draw Legal Challenges, TIME (June 20, 2018), http://time.com/5317386/do
nald-trump-child-separation-flores-ruling [https://perma.cc/WR7R-TJ3C].
29. Tara Tidwell Cullen, ICE Released Its Most Comprehensive Immigration
Detention Data Yet. It’s Alarming, NAT’L IMMIGR. JUST. CTR. (Mar. 13, 2018),
https://immigrantjustice.org/staff/blog/ice-released-its-most-comprehensive-
immigration-detention-data-yet [https://perma.cc/CA88-8ZU5].
30. Denise Gilman & Luis Romero, Detention, Inc. 15 (Univ. of Tex. Sch. of Law
Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Res. Paper Series No. 692, 2018), (https://papers.ssrn.co
m/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3127836) [http://perma.cc/9ATH-RXEE].
31. Id.
32. Id. at 10.
33. Id. at 11.
34. Id.
8
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 17
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol45/iss1/17
2019] DUE PROCESS BARRIERS IN IMMIGRATION DETENTION 327
A 2018 investigation into the influence of economic inequality on
immigration detention showed “evidence that ICE manages detention
length to ensure high detention rates” and “regularly imposes high
bond requirements as a condition of release, without correlation to
individualized flight risk or danger factors and despite evidence
indicating that detention is not necessary to ensure appearances at
immigration hearings.”35 The failure to correlate flight risk or danger
factors with bond requirements emerged from an analysis of the
method of bond determinations, length of detention, and reasons for
release in an adult female detention center in Taylor, Texas, which
houses almost exclusively asylum seekers. Data showed that during
specific periods of time, individuals at the detention center would be
released quickly on an order of recognizance, having to pay no bond.36
Immediately following that period, however, ICE would set bonds at
consistently high rates of around $7,500, in order to “manage
numbers of detainees and length of time in detention.”37 Due to the
prohibitively high bond rates, indigent individuals were unable to
post bail and remained in immigration detention indefinitely.38 In this
way, “economic disadvantage is a powerful indicator of likelihood of
lengthy detention.”39
Constitutional challenges have been brought against ICE’s
practice of setting excessively high bond amounts, arguing that this
practice essentially amounts to the deprivation of liberty based on
poverty. In Hernandez v. Sessions, the Ninth Circuit held that “due
process likely requires consideration of financial circumstances and
alternative conditions of release” in setting bond amounts for non-
citizens awaiting removal proceedings.40 Failure to consider these
aspects, the court reasoned, undermines the legitimate purpose of
bonds to ensure a non-citizen’s presence at future hearings and does
“little more than punish[] a person for his poverty.”41
As the Trump administration works to increase the number of
immigration detention facilities across the U.S. border,42 for-profit
35. Id. at 21, 24.
36. Id. at 25.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 26.
39. Id. at 30.
40. 872 F.3d 976, 991 (9th Cir. 2017).
41. Id. at 992 (quoting Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 671 (1983)).
42. Jolie McCullough & Chris Essig, The Trump Administration is Making Plans to
Detain More Immigrants in Texas, TEX. TRIB. (Aug. 2, 2018, 12:00 AM),
9
Woods: Barriers to Due Process for Indigent Asylum Seekers in Immigratio
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2019
328 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:1
prisons are winning huge contracts with terms favorable to
maintaining certain occupancy rates that will continue to bring in
huge profits.43 In April 2018, one such private prison company, the
GEO Group, won a $110 million, ten-year contract with ICE for a
1,000-bed detention facility in Conroe, Texas, from which the
company expects to generate $44 million in annualized revenues.44
Should ICE’s attempts to maintain daily bed quotas in immigrant
detention centers continue, bond hearings will remain a significant
barrier for indigent detainees. Indigent migrants are more likely to
have entered the United States illegally and therefore seek asylum
defensively. Indigent immigrants are also less likely to have access to
counsel during bond hearings, leaving them susceptible to continued
abuse by the government in setting and reviewing bond
determinations—that is, if release on bond is even an option during
the Trump administration.
III. APPOINTING COUNSEL TO DETAINED ASYLUM SEEKERS
As the likelihood of wide-scale prolonged detention of asylum
seekers increasingly becomes a reality, additional due process
concerns draw into focus, especially regarding the appointment of
counsel. Immigrants’ rights advocates and scholars have long argued
for the appointment of counsel to indigent asylum seekers because of
the liberties at stake in an asylum claim: the complexities of
immigration law; the power disparities between unrepresented non-
citizens and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) attorneys;
and various cultural barriers, among other considerations.45
https://www.texastribune.org/2018/08/02/trump-administration-texas-migrant-
detention-facilities-map [https://perma.cc/U9M7-AEGK].
43. See Livia Luan, Profiting from Enforcement: The Role of Private Prisons in U.S.
Immigration Detention, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (May 2, 2018), https://www.migration
policy.org/article/profiting-enforcement-role-private-prisons-us-immigration-
detention [https://perma.cc/H4GU-N44R] (“A day after the election, GEO Group
stock prices rose 21 percent and CoreCivic stocks soared by 43 percent.”).
44. Press Release, GEO Grp., Inc., The GEO Group Awarded Contract for the
Development and Operation of a New Company-Owned 1,000-Bed Detention Facility
in Texas (Apr. 13, 2017), http://investors.geogroup.com/file/Index?KeyFile=20000
88787 [https://perma.cc/DSG6-7UAQ].
45. See, e.g., John R. Mills et al., “Death is Different” and a Refugee’s Right to
Counsel, 42 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 361, 377 (2009); Nimrod Pitsker, Comment, Due Process
for All: Applying Eldridge to Require Appointed Counsel for Asylum Seekers, 95 CAL. L.
REV. 169 (2007); Beth J. Werlin, Renewing the Call: Immigrants’ Right to Appointed
Counsel in Deportation Proceedings, 20 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 393, 404 (2000).
10
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 17
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol45/iss1/17
2019] DUE PROCESS BARRIERS IN IMMIGRATION DETENTION 329
However, no blanket right to counsel has yet to be
recognized. Detained asylum seekers face a number of barriers in
both obtaining effective legal counsel and in representing themselves
pro se. The presence of these barriers lends credence to the argument
that appointment of counsel is necessary to uphold due process.
A. The Right to Legal Counsel—at No Expense?
“[A]ll ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens,
whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary or
permanent,” are entitled to due process under the Fifth Amendment
to the Constitution.46 Removal proceedings, regardless of the severe
penalties that may result from deportation, are considered civil in
nature.47 As such, any due process protections, such as access to
counsel, stem from the Fifth Amendment’s protection against
deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process, and not
the Sixth Amendment’s protections in the criminal context.48 The INA
establishes that non-citizens in removal proceedings are entitled to
the privilege of being represented by counsel of their choosing.49
Statutory provisions further promote this protection by requiring
both the government and the immigration judge to notify the
applicant of his or her right to counsel and to provide him or her with
a list of pro bono lawyers.50 However, as Congress made explicitly
clear in the statute, the applicant must secure counsel “at no expense
to the Government.”51
Individuals seeking asylum fear persecution—including severe
bodily harm, torture, death, slavery, forced labor, and sexual abuse—
in their home country because of their race, religion, nationality,
political opinion, or membership in a particular social group.52 They
believe that they cannot reasonably internally relocate and that the
government authorities in their home country will not or cannot
46. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (citations omitted).
47. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038
(1984).
48. See KATE M. MANUEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ALIENS’ RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN REMOVAL
PROCEEDINGS: IN BRIEF 2–3 (2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43613.pdf
[https/perma.cc/6uGB-8VY7].
49. Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, § 240(b)(4)(A), 66 Stat. 163 (1952)
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A) (2006)).
50. Immigration and Nationality Act § 208(d)(4).
51. Immigration and Nationality Act § 240(b)(4)(A).
52. Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(42)(A).
11
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protect them from the persecution they fear. Despite these threats to
life and liberty, courts have traditionally not appointed counsel to
indigent asylum seekers in removal proceedings; in contrast to
criminal proceedings, where deprivations of life or liberty weigh in
favor of appointed counsel.53
Recent statistics demonstrate that the likelihood of winning an
asylum case is five times greater if an individual is represented by
counsel.54 However, individuals in detention are the least likely
among immigrants in removal proceedings to obtain representation;
only 14% of detained immigrants obtain legal counsel, compared to
the 66% of non-detained immigrants that do.55 In small, rural cities,
these numbers drop further, where there is only an 11%
representation rate, compared to the 47% representation rate in
cities with populations of over 50,000. In addition, approximately
one-third of all detained cases are heard in remote locations.56 The
same statistics showed that detained immigrants with representation
were twice as likely as unrepresented individuals to obtain the
immigrant relief they sought—including asylum.57 Being detained
puts individuals at a clear disadvantage in their ability to secure
counsel and consequently, to present a strong asylum claim.
That the INA does not provide appointed counsel for indigent
asylum seekers does not mean that the Fifth Amendment does not
require such appointment. Given the consequences that could occur
as a result of a wrongful denial of asylum—death, torture, forced
labor, and sexual slavery—many have argued that appointment of
counsel should be mandatory.58 The Supreme Court has long
53. MANUEL, supra note 48, at 2–3.
54. TRAC IMMIGRATION, ASYLUM REPRESENTATION RATES HAVE FALLEN AMID RISING
DENIAL RATES, (2017), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/491 [https://perma.
cc/L6NZ-6XCV].
55. INGRID EAGLY & STEVEN SHAFER, ACCESS TO COUNSEL IN IMMIGRATION COURT 2 (2016)
[hereinafter COUNSEL IN IMMIGRATION COURT], https://www.americanimmigrationcoun
cil.org/sites/default/files/research/access_to_counsel_in_immigration_court.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PC96-MWN7]. When viewing these statistics on an individual
detention-center level, the overall percentage of individuals without legal counsel is
even more staggering. Id. at 9.
56. Id. at 11.
57. Id. at 3.
58. See, e.g., NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., BLAZING A TRAIL: THE FIGHT FOR RIGHT TO
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recognized that deportation, while “not technically a criminal
proceeding,” is clearly a penalty.59 As such, in removal proceedings,
“meticulous care must be exercised lest the procedure by which [an
individual] is deprived of [the] liberty [to stay and live and work in the
United States] not meet the essential standards of fairness.”60
Indeed, courts have recognized that due process considerations
may require the appointment of counsel in removal proceedings.61 In
the seminal case Aguilera-Enriquez v. INS, the Sixth Circuit found that
whether a noncitizen required appointed counsel in deportation
proceedings is a case-specific inquiry, dependent on “whether, in a
given case, the assistance of counsel would be necessary to provide
‘fundamental fairness, the touchstone of due process.’”62 The court
reasoned that where “an unrepresented indigent alien would require
counsel to present his position adequately to an immigration judge,”
due process might require government-provided counsel.63 However,
in Aguilera-Enriquez, the court found that “[c]ounsel could have
obtained no different administrative result,” thus denying the
petitioner’s claimed due-process violation.64
Aguilera-Enriquez adopted the Supreme Court’s fundamental
fairness test as laid out in Gagnon v. Scarpelli,65 which calls for an
“after-the-fact examination of the process an alien received to
determine if additional procedural safeguards would have affected
the ultimate outcome.”66 However, many immigration advocates and
academics are quick to point out that the application of this standard
is outdated today.67 Two years after the Aguilera-Enriquez decision
59. Bridges v. Warren, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945); see also Padilla v. Kentucky, 559
U.S. 356, 365 (2010).
60. Bridges, 326 U.S. at 154.
61. See United States v. Campos-Asencio, 833 F.2d 506, 609 (5th Cir. 1987);
Aguilera-Enriquez v. Immigration & Nationality Serv., 516 F.2d 565, 568 (6th Cir.
1975).
62. Aguilera-Enriquez, 516 F.2d at 568 (quoting Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S.
778, 790 (1973)).
63. See id. at 568 n.3.
64. Id. at 569.
65. Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 779.
66. Pitsker, supra note 45, at 176–77 (describing how “the Aguilera-Enriquez
court adopted the fundamental fairness due process test from the Supreme Court case
of Gagnon v. Scarpelli, decided two years earlier”).
67. Id. at 177 (“After 1976, the Eldridge factors became the touchstone due
process test and theoretically should have replaced the Aguilera-Enriquez
fundamental fairness standard.”); Werlin, supra note 45, at 404 (“Less than two years
after the Aguilera-Enriquez court cited fundamental fairness as the touchstone of due
13
Woods: Barriers to Due Process for Indigent Asylum Seekers in Immigratio
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2019
332 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:1
established “fundamental fairness” as the hallmark for inquiring as to
the need for appointed counsel in deportation proceedings to protect
due process, the Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge 68 “adopted
explicit guidelines for determining what constitutes fundamental
fairness.”69 The Eldridge balancing test requires a court to weigh three
factors in determining whether appointment of counsel in civil
proceedings is required by due process:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including
the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail.70
The Eldridge factors became the touchstone for fundamental
fairness considerations in the civil context for citizens; however,
courts have not traditionally applied this standard in non-citizen
determinations.71 Although “no court has declared that [Eldridge] is
inapplicable to . . . aliens,” in practice, courts have applied the pre-
Eldridge fundamental fairness test adopted by Aguilera-Enriquez or a
similar “no prejudice” rule.72 In the application of these less rigorous,
pre-Eldridge standards, courts have consistently found no need for
appointed counsel in removal proceedings.73 Furthermore, some
courts continue to maintain that there is no right to appointed counsel
process, the Supreme Court adopted explicit guidelines for determining what
constitutes fundamental fairness.”).
68. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
69. Werlin, supra note 45, at 404.
70. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335.
71. There is one notable and categorical exception—that of legal permanent
residents. See Johan Fatemi, A Constitutional Case for Appointed Counsel in
Immigration Proceedings: Revisiting Franco-Gonzalez, 90 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 915, 928
(2016).
72. Id. at 928. “The Third, Sixth, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits have applied the
‘fundamental fairness’ standard,” while the “Fourth, Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits have employed a harmless error standard.” See id. at 925.
73. See Mills, supra note 45, at 366 (citing Vides-Vides v. Immigration &
Naturalization Serv., 783 F.2d 1463, 1470 (9th Cir. 1986)); see also Pitsker, supra note
45, at 171 (stating that courts routinely fail to apply the Eldridge standard in an
immigration context); Werlin, supra note 46, at 404 (asserting that in practice, the
courts’ “case-by-case approach has essentially resulted in across-the-board denials of
appointed counsel”).
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at all, simply because there is no statutory right.74A strong academic
basis exists for arguing both that (1) the Eldridge factors apply to
fundamental fairness considerations regarding appointment of
counsel in removal proceedings, and (2) in applying the Eldridge test,
there should be a blanket right to appointed counsel for indigent
noncitizens in removal proceedings.75 Specifically in relation to
asylum seekers—for whom removal could lead to persecution,
torture, or death in the applicant’s home country—some advocates
argue that the Eldridge factors clearly weigh in favor of appointed
counsel, as the risk of erroneous deprivation of life and liberty is
extremely high.76
Analysis of the Eldridge factors in relation to appointed counsel
for asylum seekers has been well explored by legal scholars.77 The
profound liberty interests and gravity of the harm that can occur in an
erroneous asylum finding cannot be overstated. Individuals seeking
asylum fear persecution—usually in the form of grave and
irreversible bodily harm or deprivation of liberty—based on specific
protected grounds.78 Given the risk of erroneous deprivation and the
value of additional or substitute procedural safeguards, the
importance in adding appointed counsel is clear. The statistics cited
above show that there are “immense disparities in the outcomes of
asylum cases based on whether the asylum seeker had
representation.”79
The complexity of asylum law and deportation proceedings,
cultural and language barriers, and the impacts of trauma all bear on
the inability of pro se respondents to represent themselves and on the
importance of effective counsel. Various analyses have concluded that
while the financial burden of appointed counsel would likely be
substantial, the cost would not be unreasonable, and would be offset
by the benefits that appointed counsel brings in simultaneously
supporting various government interests.80
74. See United States v. Lara-Unzueta, 287 F. Supp. 2d 888, 892 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
75. See, e.g., Fatemi, supra note 71, at 915; Mills, supra note 45, at 361; Pitsker,
supra note 45, at 169; Werlin, supra note 45, at 393.
76. See, e.g., Mills, supra note 45, at 361; Pitsker, supra note 45, at 169.
77. See, e.g., Fatemi, supra note 71, at 915; Mills, supra note 45, at 361; Pitsker,
supra note 45, at 169; Werlin, supra note 45, at 393.
78. Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, § 101(a)(42)(A), 66 Stat. 163
(1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2014)).
79. Pitsker, supra note 45, at 189.
80. See, e.g., Mills, supra note 45, at 361; Pitsker, supra note 45, at 169; Werlin,
supra note 45, at 393.
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In Turner v. Rogers, the U. S. Supreme Court breathed new life into
the argument that the Eldridge test requires appointment of counsel
in defensive asylum cases.81 The Court utilized the Eldridge test to
determine whether a citizen was constitutionally entitled to counsel
at their contempt hearing after failing to make court-ordered child
support payments.82 In finding that the citizen was not, the Court
highlighted several factors that weighed against appointed counsel.83
The factors most relevant to this discussion are the state’s usual lack
of representation and the relative simplicity of those proceedings.84
These factors help demonstrate the need for appointed counsel in
removal proceedings for asylum seekers, where the government is
always represented and the proceedings often present complex legal
issues.85 Without additional procedural safeguards, the practical
barriers to pro se representation and to effective representation
increase the already-high risk of erroneous deprivation—further
substantiating the need for appointed counsel to indigent detained
asylum seekers.
B. Barriers to Procedural Due Process for Indigent Asylum Seekers in
Detention
Indigent asylum seekers pending removal proceedings in
mandatory detention face considerable barriers; not only to
representing themselves pro se, but also to receiving access to
counsel, given the physical infrastructure and limitations of
immigrant detention centers. These challenges help tip the balance of
an Eldridge analysis strongly towards finding that due process
mandates appointed counsel for detained asylum seekers; or
alternatively, that the immigration detention model requires vast
structural changes to safeguard procedural due process.
Various detention standards apply to the more than 1000
detention facilities that ICE operates. Only 65% of ICE’s adult
81. 564 U.S. 431 (2011).
82. Id. at 444–45.
83. Id. at 446.
84. Id.; Fatemi, supra note 71, at 932; Lucas Guttentag & Ahilan Arulanantham,
Extending the Promise of Gideon: Immigration, Deportation, and the Right to Counsel,
39 A.B.A. HUM. RTS., (2013), https://www.americanbar.org/publications/human_rig
hts_magazine_home/2013_vol_39/vol_30_no_4_gideon/extending_the_promise_of_g
ideon.html [https://perma.cc/K98E-8L75].
85. See generally Fatemi, supra note 71; Guttentag & Arulanantham, supra note
84.
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detention facilities are contractually bound by one of three sets of ICE
detention standards, although ICE maintains that all its facilities are
inspected under one of these three standards.86 About 63% of all
detention facilities are inspected under the most robust set of
detention standards employed by ICE—the 2011 Performance-Based
National Detention Standards.87 According to ICE’s National Detainee
Handbook, every detainee has the right to access law library
resources and legal assistance.88 Detained individuals are entitled to
five hours each week to work on their legal cases in the law library, by
accessing “approved legal materials and office equipment,” including
computers, typewriters, copy machines, etc., to copy and prepare legal
documents.89 In some facilities, legal rights presentations are
available free of charge if local legal rights groups exist and offer them
to the detainees.90 Detained individuals are also allowed to make free
phone calls to find a lawyer and speak to their lawyers. Phone calls
with lawyers are limited to twenty minutes at a time, and detained
non-citizens must take special steps to ensure their legal calls are not
monitored.91 Detained individuals are further allowed to meet with
lawyers and paralegals a minimum of eight hours per day on
weekdays and four hours per day on weekends and holidays.92 They
are also able to send and receive confidential legal mail as long as it
follows specific labeling rules; this mail can be opened and inspected
in front of detained recipients, but it should not be read.93 If the
detention facility determines that a detained individual cannot afford
postage, detainees can send legal mail for free.94 Many of these rights
and provisions depend on the rules of the specific facility where a
noncitizen is detained, including the availability of group legal-rights
86. Cullen, supra note 29.
87. Id.; see also U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, PERFORMANCE-BASED NATIONAL
DETENTION STANDARDS 2011 (2013) [hereinafter DETENTION STANDARDS], https://www.
ice.gov/doclib/detention-standards/2011/pbnds2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/7T8B-
RM5G].
88. U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENF’T, NATIONAL DETAINEE HANDBOOK: CUSTODY
MANAGEMENT 4 (2016) [hereinafter CUSTODY MANAGEMENT], https://www.ice.gov/sites
/default/files/documents/Document/2017/detainee-handbook.PDF
[https://perma.cc/2DXY-KDAG].
89. Id. at 9; DETENTION STANDARDS, supra note 87, at 417.
90. CUSTODY MANAGEMENT, supra note 88, at 9.
91. Id. at 8.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 10.
94. CUSTODY MANAGEMENT, supra note 88, at 11.
17
Woods: Barriers to Due Process for Indigent Asylum Seekers in Immigratio
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2019
336 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:1
presentations, law library hours and capacity, and visitation hours.95
Despite these standards and safeguards, studies and firsthand
accounts reveal that in many private- and state-run facilities, legal
resources are restricted, inaccessible, and sometimes non-existent.
1. Barriers to Pro Se Representation in Detention
Immigrants represented by counsel are much more likely to be
released from detention pending removal hearings, to apply for relief
from deportation, and to receive the immigration relief they sought.96
Detained immigrants with legal counsel are eleven times more likely
to seek relief—such as asylum—than their unrepresented
counterparts, and three times more likely to receive the relief they
seek.97 Despite this disparity in outcomes, many immigrants in
detention are unable to obtain legal counsel—pro bono or otherwise.
As outlined above, under ICE standards, detained asylum seekers
should have various free legal resources available to them to work on
their legal cases from detention. Yet, often times, detention facilities
do not provide the resources to detainees that ICE policies guarantee.
a. Legal Rights Presentations
The Department of Justice (DOJ) Executive Office of Immigration
Review, through the Vera Institute of Justice and subcontracted legal
services organizations, provides basic legal information and
“comprehensive explanations about immigration court proceedings”
to detained individuals through the Legal Orientation Program
(LOP).98 However, LOP programs do not exist in many of the
immigrant detention facilities that are located in remote areas.99 LOP
services are currently available in approximately forty detention
facilities.100 However, the program has been on the Trump
95. Id. at 9.
96. COUNSEL IN IMMIGRATION COURT, supra note 55, at 16–22.
97. Ingrid Eagly & Steven Shafer, A National Study of Access to Counsel in
Immigration Court, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 57 (2015) [hereinafter National Study].
98. Legal Orientation Program, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Apr. 25, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/legal-orientation-program [https://perma.cc/SWA6-
Z9VU].
99. See Marina Caeiro, Legal Orientation Program, VERA INST. JUST.,
https://www.vera.org/projects/legal-orientation-program/legal-orientation-progr
am-lop-facilities [https://perma.cc/M3LQ-DMGZ] (listing facilities where the Legal
Orientation Program is available).
100. Id.
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administration’s chopping block since April 2018, when the DOJ
announced suspension of the project and then quickly reversed
course.101 ICE guarantees group legal-rights presentations when
available, but detained immigrants in various locations have noted
that they were unaware of LOP programs where they existed. In some
instances, even when the detained immigrants were aware of the
existence of LOP programs at their facilities, there was no method
available for the detainees to register for the programs.102
b. Legal Resources
According to ICE detention standards, detained immigrants are
guaranteed the right to access a law library to prepare for their
case.103 However, the resources available in these libraries vary
across detention centers, as does access. A 2018 report by the
Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) of six detention facilities showed
that “legal materials available in the law libraries [were] very
outdated; that country condition reports vital for asylum applications
were several years old; and that few of the materials [were] available
in Spanish.”104 In one detention facility, the legal materials 2002.105
Information critical to an asylum application, such as case law,
statutory texts, and country conditions reports, was also outdated.106
In one detention facility, available country condition reports were
seventeen years old.107
101. Jeff Sessions, Attorney General, Opening Statement Before the Senate
Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies
(Apr. 25, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/opening-statement-attorney-
general-jeff-sessions-senate-appropriations-subcommittee
[https://perma.cc/947H-BSLX]; Joshua Breisblatt, Justice Department Will Not Halt
Legal Orientation Program for Detained Immigrants, Reversing Course for Now, IMMIGR.
IMPACT (Apr. 25, 2018), http://immigrationimpact.com/2018/04/25/justice-
department-legal-orientation-program-not-halt [https://perma.cc/H9EX-L25T].
102. Letter from S. Poverty Law Ctr. and Human Rights Watch, to Juan Osuna, Dir.,
Executive Office of Immigration Review (Aug. 25, 2016), https://www.themarshallp
roject.org/documents/3117141-2016-8-25-Stewart-Detention-Center-EOIR-
Letter#.y6otEZIHi [https://perma.cc/R8JH-29ME].
103. DETENTION STANDARDS, supra note 87, at 65; Letter from S. Poverty Law Ctr.
and Human Rights Watch, supra note 102.
104. S. POVERTY LAW CTR., SHADOW PRISONS: IMMIGRANT DETENTION IN THE SOUTH 10
(2016), [hereinafter SHADOW PRISONS], https://www.splcenter.org/20161121/shado
w-prisons-immigrant-detention-south [http://perma.cc/US7E-ZLEJ].
105. Id. at 39.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 54.
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Moreover, merely accessing legal resources is a challenge for
many detained asylum seekers. At Wakulla County Detention Center
in Crawfordville, Florida, posted hours showed that the law library
was only open for two hours each weekend day, in clear violation of
detainee rights.108 During the week, the county rents out the library
space to the police department for other activities; even on weekends,
the library personnel has turned away detainees “because they are
short-staffed.”109 Other facilities have turned detainees away because
the law library was being used for haircuts.110 Detainees in Irwin
County Detention Center in Ocilla, Georgia, have reported difficulty
accessing the law library.111 One inmate reported not having ever
accessed the law library because guards refused to respond to
requests to use the facility.112 Additionally, a tour of the Etowah
County Detention Center in Gadsden, Alabama, revealed that the law
library in that facility did not contain a single book.113
c. Administrative Resources
Along with access to legal resources, detainees are entitled to
basic administrative resources, such as computers, printers,
photocopiers, paper, writing utensils, and other related office supplies
to aid detained individuals in preparing documents for legal
proceedings.114 Likewise, for “the safety and security of the facility,
detainees shall be provided with a means of saving any legal work in
a secure and private electronic format, password protected.”115
According to the Performance-Based National Detention Standards,
facility staff should check equipment every day to ensure “it is in good
working order, and to stock sufficient supplies.”116 However, access to
108. DETENTION STANDARDS, supra note 87, at 402–03 (requiring each facility to
have a flexible schedule that allows maximum possible library use); SHADOW PRISONS,
supra note 104, at 64.
109. SHADOW PRISONS, supra note 104, at 64.
110. Id. at 47.
111. Id. at 47.
112. Id. at 23.
113. Id. at 54. Although access to legal materials exists in a computer-based law
library, these materials are not often updated and offer no way for inmates to
privately store relevant documents, thus making the system ineffective. Id.
114. DETENTION STANDARDS, supra note 87, at 403. These requirements are again
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these fundamentals is severely restricted in detention facilities. As the
SPLC report demonstrates, insufficient and substandard resources
are often all that are available to pro se applicants.117
Additionally, at many immigrant detention facilities, computers
and other office equipment are consistently out of order, out of date,
or malfunctioning.118 At the Wakulla County Detention Center, the
computers in the law library could not read files from legal research
software.119 At the Etowah County Detention Center, a detainee noted
that Microsoft Word was too old to function and that the computers
available did not have a CD-ROM drive to access Freedom of
Information Act information that was critical to the detainee’s case.120
In other facilities, office equipment was constantly broken for
extended periods of time. In one instance, printers were out of toner
for over a week.121
Detainees are also denied access to equipment necessary for the
development of their legal case by detention facility staff. In one
facility, detainees reported being limited to one photocopy per
document, making it “nearly impossible to obtain the three copies
required for court filings.”122 Another alarming issue across detention
facilities is the lack of secure storage of electronic versions of legal
documents. Detainees at various detention centers reported having
no safe space to store computer files. Although ICE facilities are
required to provide secure, password protected storage, the SPLC
report found that multiple facilities did not fulfill this requirement.
Detainees had to either purchase USB flash drives from the
commissary for $14 or try to “hide . . . personal legal files in folders on
the computer,” sometimes returning to find their information
erased.123 In all instances, information relating to an individual’s
asylum case is extremely sensitive and confidential.124 Accordingly,
the risks associated with storing case-related information in an
117. See generally SHADOW PRISONS, supra note 104.
118. See id. at 64.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 54.
121. Id. at 47, 54.
122. Id. at 39.
123. Id. at 47, 54, 64.
124. DETENTION STANDARDS, supra note 87, at 425 (asserting that detention
facilities should take measures to ensure and protect the confidentiality of each
detainee’s “detention file”).
21
Woods: Barriers to Due Process for Indigent Asylum Seekers in Immigratio
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2019
340 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:1
unsecure location or format are significant for detained asylum
seekers.
Equally alarming, the SPLC report demonstrated that detainees
at various facilities experienced difficulties in receiving documents
that were critical to their cases sent by mail by their family
members.125 Other detainees reported detention officials opening
their marked legal correspondence outside of the detainees’ presence,
as well as guards failing to provide indigent detainees with the
required postage and supplies necessary for legal correspondence.126
Detainees also experienced difficulty in making calls relating to their
legal cases due to lack of personal funds or access to a secure or
private line.127
Indigent detainees who are not provided paper, stamps, USB
storage devices, or free legal calls may, in many detention facilities,
work for exploitative rates through the Voluntary Work Program
(VWP). Under this program, detainees may work up to eight hours a
day, for a maximum of forty hours weekly.128 Compensation for a
detainee’s work is “at least $1.00 (USD) per day.”129 While private-
prison providers may choose to pay more than this meager amount,
ICE caps its compensation to contracting companies at paying
detainees at $1 a day.130 Many detention centers depend on detained
immigrants to perform the jobs required for the centers’ maintenance
and operation, including washing laundry, preparing and serving
meals, and the general cleaning of restrooms and common areas.131
Accordingly, if an indigent client wants to save his legal documents on
a secure USB flash drive, they must work 112 hours cleaning toilets or
washing dishes in order to buy this item from the commissary in a
facility with a standard pay scale of $1 for a full day (8 hours) of
125. SHADOW PRISONS, supra note 104, at 40, 54.
126. Id. at 54, 65.
127. Id.
128. DETENTION STANDARDS, supra note 87, at 385.
129. Id.
130. Yana Kunichoff, “Voluntary” Work Program Run in Private Detention Centers
Pays Detained Immigrants $1 a Day, TRUTHOUT (Jul. 27, 2012), https://truthout.org/a
rticles/voluntary-work-program-run-in-private-detention-centers-pays-detained-
immigrants-1-a-day [https://perma.cc/N3X5-HS3X].
131. Press Release, U.S. Comm’n of Civil Rights, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights
Concerned with Alleged Abusive Labor Practices at Immigration Detention Centers 2
(Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.usccr.gov/press/2017/12-21-PR.pdf [https://perma.
cc/7ZJF-NDK8].
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work.132 It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the rights
violations inherent in the exploitative VWP, but this example
demonstrates the extreme challenges detained indigent asylum
seekers face in attempting to represent themselves pro se.133
2. Barriers to Access to Counsel in Detention
A multitude of barriers impede detained asylum seekers’ access
to counsel. Locating counsel willing to represent detained asylum
seekers individuals is challenging. Additionally, once counsel is
obtained, numerous additional barriers exist to providing detained
clients with effective legal service. Immigrants in detention are the
least likely among immigrants in removal proceedings to obtain legal
counsel—on average, only 14% obtained legal representation
between 2007 and 2012.134 Additionally, substantial disparities exist
within this small percentage of represented detained immigrants,
depending on the location of detention. For example, detained
immigrants in rural areas, like Lumpkin, Georgia, had legal
representation in only 6% of cases; whereas detained immigrants in
more urban areas like Miami, Florida, were represented in 20% of
cases.135
One major obstacle to obtaining counsel for detainees is the rural
nature of a large percentage of immigration detention facilities. As of
132. SHADOW PRISONS, supra note 104, at 54 (explaining that a flash drive costs $14
at a detention facility commissary).
133. See id. This shockingly low pay rate has been in place since 1950 and has not
changed for almost seventy years, despite inflation. Id.; see also Jacqueline Stevens,
One Dollar Per Day: The Slaving Wages of Immigration Jail, From 1943 to Present, 29
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 391 (2016). In 1990, the court in Guevara v. Immigration & Nationality
Service upheld the $1 per day compensation rate for detained immigrants, ruling that
detainees were not employees entitled to protections under the Fair Labor Standards
Act. 902 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1990). Challenges to this pay rate continue under theories
of unjust enrichment, violations of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, and
violations of the Thirteenth Amendment. See Menocal v. GEO Grp., Inc., 882 F.3d 905
(10th Cir. 2018); Barrientos v. CoreCivic, Inc., No. 4:18-CV-70 (CDL), 2018 WL
4481956, at *2 (M.D. Ga. Aug. 17, 2018); Owino v. CoreCivic, Inc., No. 17-CV-1112 JLS
(NLS), 2018 WL 2193644, at *1 (S.D. Cal. May 14, 2018). Reports also indicate that
detention facilities force detainees to participate in the VWP under threat of solitary
confinement or other punishment. See, e.g., U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, supra note
131; Catherine E. Shoichet, Lawsuit Alleges “Forced Labor” in Immigrant Detention,
CNN (Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/04/17/us/immigrant-detention-
forced-labor-lawsuit/index.html [https://perma.cc/XZ8V-DR5N].
134. COUNSEL IN IMMIGRATION COURT, supra note 55, at 1–2.
135. Id. at 9.
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November 2017, ICE operated more than 1000 adult detention
centers in the United States, including privately-operated centers,
county jails, Bureau of Prisons facilities, hospitals, and hotels.136 While
every state hosts at least two immigrant detention facilities, southern
states on or near the U.S.-Mexico border house the most; Texas is
home to 184 detention centers, California has 120, Arizona hosts 49,
and Louisiana houses 41 immigrant detention centers.137 In the
southern states, many detention facilities are located far from major
metropolitan areas, causing these facilities to be “overwhelmingly
isolated from lawyers, legal services and other resources that may
support detainees.”138 For example, the La Salle Detention Center, in
Jena, Louisiana, is over 220 miles—just under a four-hour drive—
from the nearest metropolitan area of New Orleans. Stewart
Detention Center in Lumpkin, Georgia—the largest detention center
in the United States—is a two-and-a-half-hour drive from Atlanta.
Once immigrants are detained in these often isolated, rural facilities,
barriers unique to immigration detention make it hard for detainees
to obtain and receive effective legal counsel.
a. Barriers to Securing Legal Counsel
Some immigrants obtain legal representation upon or shortly
after entering the detention system. Immigrants not initially detained
along the U.S. border are usually housed in smaller facilities in the
central United States, which may be closer to family and pre-existing
legal relationships; however, these detainees are transferred as
necessity dictates.139 Southern states with large detention facilities in
rural areas, such as Texas, Louisiana, and California, are the most
likely to receive transports.140 A Human Rights Watch (HRW) report
from 2011 detailed the dramatic impact that transferring detainees
136. ICE Detention Facilities as of November 2017, NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUST. CTR.,
https://immigrantjustice.org/ice-detention-facilities-november-2017
[https://perma.cc/KRL2-QSQQ].
137. Leanna Garfield & Shayanne Gal, Here’s How Many ICE Detention Centers are
Holding Immigrants in Every State, BUS. INSIDER (Jun. 22, 2018, 1:20 PM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/ice-immigrant-families-dhs-detention-centers-
2018-6 [https://perma.cc/XYF2-3MR3].
138. SHADOW PRISONS, supra note 104, at 9.
139. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LOCKED UP FAR AWAY: THE TRANSFER OF IMMIGRANTS TO
REMOTE DETENTION CENTERS IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2009), https://www.hrw.org/site
s/default/files/reports/us1209webwcover_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/EH6B-EXJB].
140. Id. at 6, 33–34.
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across ICE’s wide range of detention facilities can have on legal
representation; specifically on established attorney-client
relationships. In the report, HRW uncovered that ICE routinely failed
to inform attorneys of their detained clients’ whereabouts. In “nearly
every case documented . . . attorneys learned of the transfers not from
ICE, but rather from the detainee or his family.”141
In many instances, after a transfer, the challenges of long-
distance lawyering are insurmountable. Additionally, continued
representation of detained immigrants, most often by pro bono
attorneys, can be cost-prohibitive. Moreover, long-distance
communication between client and attorney can be challenging as it
is costly for an attorney to travel to in-person client meetings or
hearings. Further, even when an immigration judge allows an
attorney to appear telephonically, telephonic representation is a
problematic and less effective means of advocacy.142 In many cases,
detainee transfer leads to the termination of pre-existing lawyer-
client relationships.143 As the Trump administration ramps up the
enforcement of immigration laws and creates additional facilities
along the U.S.-Mexico border, the detention of non-citizens and their
subsequent transfer will likely continue to represent a major hurdle
in stable legal representation.
Attempting to find counsel while in detention can be a
challenging task for detainees. For instance, many detained
immigrants do not receive access to free legal calls, which are
necessary to secure counsel. Unlike other legal calls, which are limited
to twenty minutes, detained individuals are supposed to have
unlimited access to phones in order to find counsel.144 Free legal calls
are the only detainee calls that are not monitored by detention facility
staff. As a result, in situations where these calls are not provided to
detainees, despite being required, those detainees who can afford to
inquire about representation with personal funds do so on a
monitored, unsecure line—making it difficult to share confidential
and sensitive details about one’s asylum case with a prospective
lawyer. Those that cannot afford these calls remain unrepresented.
Additionally, all ICE detention facilities are required to have a list of
pro bono legal resources available to detainees. However, according
to the SPLC report, detention centers maintain outdated pro bono
141. Id. at 44.
142. Id. at 46–49.
143. Id. at 43–51.
144. CUSTODY MANAGEMENT, supra note 88, at 8.
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lists.145 For example, at the Etowah County Detention Center, the
phone list for pro bono service providers was dated from 2011,
making it five years old at the time of the SPLC study.146 Further, the
Etowah County Detention Center list included only out-of-state
providers, increasing the likelihood that pro bono legal services
would be difficult to obtain—if they still existed.
Even when pro bono lists are up-to-date, challenges remain in
securing pro bono counsel in remote areas of the country. About 30%
of all detained immigrants are housed in facilities more than one
hundred miles from the nearest legal aid resource, with a median
distance of fifty-six miles between detention facilities and
government-listed legal aid.147 Because legal aid programs are not
required to provide services to detained immigrants, distance is often
the critical factor that determines if a detained individual will receive
free counsel.148 A study of 1.2 million deportation cases from 2007 to
2012 showed that a startling 2% of detained immigrants have free
legal representation and that “representation rates dip sharply in
rural areas and small cities, where the supply of practicing
immigration attorneys is almost nonexistent.”149 Although the legal-
service providers list was up-to-date at the Stewart Detention Center
in Lumpkin, Georgia, three of the four listed attorneys were no longer
taking pro bono cases at the detention center.150 Some attorneys who
had previously represented detained immigrants at Stewart stated
that the distance and remote nature of the detention facility was too
challenging, with one attorney stating, “I won’t ever go back there.”151
Detained immigrants also struggle to obtain paid legal counsel.
Attorneys charge an average of $5,000 for an asylum case, making
hiring legal representation unattainable for indigent asylum
seekers.152 Some attorneys charge high rates to detained immigrants,
145. SHADOW PRISONS, supra note 104, at 10, 54.
146. Id. at 54.
147. Kim, supra note 8.
148. Id.
149. National Study, supra note 97, at 36.
150. Christie Thompson, Welcome to Stewart Detention Center, the Black Hole of




152. Chico Harlan, In an Immigration Court that Nearly Always Says No, a Lawyer’s
Spirit is Broken, WASH. POST (Oct. 11, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/busi
ness/economy/in-an-immigration-court-that-nearly-always-says-no-a-lawyers-
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yet provide ineffective or nonexistent legal services.153 Furthermore,
the immigration system is plagued by unlicensed “notarios”;
individuals who “represent themselves as qualified to offer legal
advice or services concerning immigration or other matters of law.”154
In Morales Apolinar v. Mukasey, the Board of Immigration Appeals
recognized the systemic abuse of notarios, stating that “all too often,
vulnerable immigrants are preyed upon by unlicensed notarios and
unscrupulous appearance attorneys who extract heavy fees in
exchange for false promises and shoddy, ineffective representation”
and that “[d]espite wide-spread awareness of these abhorrent
practices, the lamentable exploitation of the immigrant population
continues.”155 In situations where reasonably priced representation is
available, many private attorneys have stopped offering services to
detained immigrants in rural areas, citing logistical challenges.156
b. Barriers to Obtaining Effective Legal Counsel
Once a detainee obtains an attorney, numerous obstacles arise
that may prevent the detainee from receiving effective counsel. For
example, detained asylum seekers often struggle to communicate
effectively with obtained counsel. Detainees from each detention
center in the SPLC report described difficulties in sending and
receiving legal mail.157 Additionally, communication via secure
telephone line is extremely restricted in practice. Although detained
individuals are allowed limitless twenty-minute legal calls, many
detainees in the SPLC study discussed the difficulty in receiving
approval to call obtained counsel through the confidential phone line.
Some detained individuals reported having to send in multiple
requests for a legal call with their attorneys; many of those requests




154. About Notario Fraud, A.B.A,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_services/immigration/projects_initia
tives/fightnotariofraud/about_notario_fraud.html [https://perma.cc/4X3S-Q3Q5];
see also Mills, supra note 45, at 378.
155. Morales Apolinar v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 893, 897 (9th Cir. 2008).
156. Thompson, supra note 150.
157. SHADOW PRISONS, supra note 104, at 10.
158. Id. at 30, 47, 54, 65.
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Attorneys have also found it difficult, if not impossible, to
schedule calls with their detained clients.159 The stated policy at
LaSalle Detention Facility is a seventy-two-hour turn-around time to
schedule a call at an attorney or client’s request. Despite this policy, in
practice, detention center staff regularly wait up to seven days after
an attorney request to schedule a call.160 Waiting seven days to
schedule a twenty-minute phone call with a client severely restricts
counsel’s ability to provide comprehensive legal services and
“effectively prevents meaningful communication” of any kind.161 In
addition, attorneys representing individuals detained at La Salle are
not able to request multiple legal calls at once and must wait until they
complete a scheduled call before requesting another one.162
Left with no other means of effective communication, counsel
must visit detained clients in person. However, attorneys who attempt
to visit detained clients are faced with another slew of practical
barriers that detention facilities impose. First, many detention centers
are not equipped for legal visitation.163 In the SPLC report, the average
detention center provided one attorney-client visitation room for
every 511 detainees.164 In larger detention facilities, access to an
attorney-client visitation room is even more restricted. For example,
the La Salle Detention Facility and the Irwin County Detention
Center—both of which have a capacity for 1,000 or more
individuals— have just one attorney-client visitation room available
for use.165 Similarly, the Stewart Detention Center, with a capacity of
2,000 detainees, only provides three attorney-client visitation
rooms.166 Within these visitation rooms, attorneys and clients are
usually separated by a thick Plexiglas window and must communicate
through a closed-circuit telephone.167 In some instances, static
interference on these telephones made communication difficult, and
159. Id. at 47.
160. Complaint at 34, S. Poverty Law Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t Homeland Sec., (D.C. Cir.
Apr. 4, 2018) (No. 18-cv-00760), https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/doc
uments/2018-04-04_dkt_0001_complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/2RAJ-CXUZ].
161. Id. at 35.
162. Id. at 34.
163. Id. at 30, 36.
164. See SHADOW PRISONS, supra note 104.
165. Id. at 21, 27.
166. Id. at 36.
167. Id. at 27, 45, 65; Letter from Eunice Cho, S. Poverty Law Ctr., to U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enf’t (Mar. 21, 2016), https://www.themarshallproject.or
g/documents/2938040-SPLC-letter#.FfkQW6lN9 [https://perma.cc/AQ5R-3LH9].
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some attorneys reported having to shout at clients through the
Plexiglass barrier when phones were broken for extended periods of
time.168 This non-contact visitation system makes building trust and
effectively communicating with asylum seekers difficult, especially
given the sensitive nature of legal conversations. Recounting
traumatizing life events in specific detail is necessary to building a
strong asylum claim.169 Asking individuals to do this while separated
by a thick glass wall in a correctional-facility-type setting can be
additionally traumatizing and restrictive.170 These settings also make
reviewing legal documents or utilizing interpreters impracticable.
More challenging still is the seemingly arbitrary “no electronics”
policy that numerous detention facilities have instituted. During in-
person visits, attorneys are not allowed to have cell-phones,
computers, or wireless internet access.171 Prohibiting electronics
limits the use of telephonic interpretation services; the drafting of
legal documents, including client declarations; and the review of
client files and other electronically stored information. Counsel would
need to bring in printed copies of any and all relevant information,
and to draft notes and legal documents with pen and paper. In this
digital age, the lack of electronic resources in client visits severely
hinders efficient and effective legal services. For instance, lawyers
have refused to take cases at detention facilities because barriers to
language services inhibit them from “adequately and ethically”
representing clients.172 “You have to go like you are going back in
time,” said one immigration lawyer who stopped taking clients at
Stewart Detention Center because of the lack of technological
resources.173
Long wait times for legal meetings at detention facilities are
another frustrating impediment for many attorneys seeking to meet
with their detained clients. Multiple detention facilities do not allow
for pre-arranged client meetings.174 This policy means that counsel
must drive to the detention facility to request a legal meeting, then
168. Complaint, supra note 160, at 34.
169. Id.
170. See id.
171. Id. at 27.
172. Id. at 27–28 (“Under the circumstances, however, attorneys are left to rely
on gestures, guesstimates, and whatever else can be communicated through broken
or no English in order to gather crucial evidence to avert deportation.”).
173. Thompson, supra note 150.
174. Id.
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wait for hours, in an electronics-free area, before officials take the
attorney to their client in a visitation room. In March 2016, the SPLC,
with support of over twenty-five pro bono and private immigration
service providers, submitted a complaint to ICE, DHS, and others
regarding the denial of attorney access at Stewart Detention Center.
The letter outlined the various arbitrary delays and outright denials
of client meetings that unlawfully obstructed of the availability of
legal representation.175
The failure of detention facilities to abide by ICE regulations in
relation to legal access often leads attorneys to cease
representation.176 In April 2018, the SPLC filed suit against the
Department of Homeland Security for unconstitutionally blocking
detained immigrants’ access to lawyers in three detention facilities in
Louisiana and Georgia.177 The complaint cited many of the barriers to
attorney-client representation and effective legal representation
outlined above. As this case develops, thousands of asylum seekers
are detained, awaiting removal proceedings without counsel or access
to effective counsel. Without a complete overhaul of the existing
immigrant detention infrastructure in the United States, geographical
and logistical barriers—whether intentionally constructed or not—
will continue to unconstitutionally deny indigent asylum seekers due
process of law.
IV. CONCLUSION
Following up on campaign promises, the Trump administration
has enacted numerous policy shifts impacting asylum seekers in the
United States. In January 2017, President Trump announced a new
policy geared towards the mandatory detention of all defensive
asylum seekers throughout the duration of their removal
175. Letter from Eunice Cho, supra note 167; see also Nina Rabin, Women in
Immigration Detention Facilities in Arizona, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 695, 712 (2009)
(discussing long wait times for women detainees to visit with attorneys); Kim, supra
note 8 (“London, like many immigration attorneys, spends a lot of time just trying to
meet face-to-face with her clients. It’s a good day when she actually meets them.”).
176. Thompson, supra note 150; see also Kim, supra note 8.
177. Complaint, supra note 160; S. Poverty Law Ctr., SPLC Sues DHS for
Unconstitutionally Blocking Detained Immigrants’ Access to Lawyers, SLPC NEWS
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proceedings.178 In June 2018, Attorney General Jeff Sessions
attempted to undercut asylum protections for individuals fleeing
domestic violence and gang-related violence in Matter of A-B-.179
Shortly thereafter, the Trump administration ripped apart thousands
of asylum-seeking families as part of a new “zero tolerance” policy for
illegal border crossers, citing protections against the prolonged
detention of migrant children as forcing its hand towards family
separation.180 That same month, President Trump, via his personal
Twitter account, advocated for the complete denial of due process
protections for ostensibly anyone crossing the U.S. border.181
Constitutional due process protections must apply to the Draconian
immigration policies impacting asylum seekers that the Trump
administration continues to implement.
Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to rule on the due
process right of immigrants in prolonged and indefinite detention to
periodic bond hearings.182 As a result, lower courts are left to
interpret what the Constitution requires in these situations.
Generally, lower courts have recognized that due process may require
government-appointed counsel to indigent asylum seekers. However,
the courts have yet to find an instance in which a lack of government-
appointed counsel has denied due process to an immigrant in removal
proceedings.183 A strong foundation of academic scholarship and
developing legal challenges exist arguing for the blanket appointment
of counsel to indigent or detained immigrants in removal proceedings
under the Eldridge test and Turner conditions.
178. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 845 (2018); Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S.
510, 512 (2003).
179. 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018). See generally NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CTR.,
ASYLUM PRACTICE ADVISORY: APPLYING FOR ASYLUM AFTER MATTER OF A-B- (2018),
https://www.immigrantjustice.org/sites/default/files/content-type/resource/docu
ments/201-06/Matter%20of%20A-B-%20Practice%20Advisory%20-%20Final%2
0-%206.21.18.pdf [https://perma.cc/RMU3-CL6P] (summarizing relevant pre-
Matter of A-B- case law from the BIA and 7th Circuit, analyzing AG Sessions’s holding
in Matter of A-B-, and providing detailed practice tips for attorneys representing
clients with domestic violence and gang-based claims post Matter of A-B-).
180. See generally Maya Rhodan, Here are the Facts About President Trump’s
Family Separation Policy, TIME (June 20, 2018, 10:37 AM), http://time.com/5314769
/family-separation-policy-donald-trump [https://perma.cc/7N57-GXDD],
describing the Trump administration’s stance on family separation.
181. See Cranley, supra note 2.
182. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018).
183. See supra Part III.A.
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As statistics demonstrate, a lack of counsel in immigration
proceedings is often determinative on the outcome of an asylum
claim.184 As this cursory analysis of the practical, logistical, and
geographical barriers to representing detained asylum seekers
demonstrates, detained asylum seekers must overcome numerous,
often insurmountable, barriers to obtain effective legal counsel. These
barriers are even greater if an asylum seeker is indigent. Given the
incredibly severe and irreversible consequences of an erroneous
asylum adjudication, the private-interest rights of life and liberty at
stake in an asylum-based claim against removal are immeasurable.
The procedures currently in place for detained asylum seekers to
obtain legal counsel of any quality or to proceed pro se are basely
inadequate. Statistics show that non-detained asylum seekers and
asylum seekers with counsel are scores more times likely to receive
asylum.185 The U.S. government spends billions of dollars a year on
immigrant detention, yet admits that over 50% of the daily immigrant
detainee population poses no threat to U.S. society.186 The
government has no legitimate interest in maintaining or increasing
the immigrant detention system, but has every legitimate interest in
promoting the due process protections of asylum seekers as
established by the U.S. Constitution.
184. See id.
185. COUNSEL IN IMMIGRATION COURT, supra note 55, at 15–18.
186. Cullen, supra note 29.
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